Draw ing on a critical analysis of contemporary Mexican social and political phenomena, and on a tw o-year-long ethnography w ith the #YoSoy132 netw orked movement, this article demonstrates that digital tools have been successfully deployed by Mexican parties and governments in order to manufacture consent, sabotage dissidence, threaten activists, and gather personal data w ithout citizens' agreement. These new algorithmic strategies, it is contended, clearly show that there is nothing inherently democratic in digital communication technologies, and that citizens and activists have to struggle against increasingly sophisticated techniques of control and repression that exploit the very mechanisms that many consider to be emancipatory technologies.
Introduction: com ing to term s with techno-optim ism within digital dem ocratic participation
There is a shared tendency in different strands of the literature on civic engagement, digital activism and protest movements -as w ell as in reflections on the possibilities afforded by open/'big' data for increasing democratic participation -to view digital technology as the key to easier government accountability, and the panacea that can easily solve the various issues that plague the w orn apparatus of contemporary public institutions. For instance, in recent years the literature on social movements and digital media technologies has often reduced diverse complex socio-technical configurations and cultural contexts to simple, easy-to-understand Tw itter or Facebook 'revolutions'. At the same time, the technological developments enabling the publication of Open Data and the tools and capacities to engage w ith it have been at the forefront of techno-optimism in the transparency and accountability field. These developments hold the potential for making vast amounts of government dataincluding budget and procurement information -w idely available to huge numbers of citizens, w ho, as the hypothesis goes, w ill then be able to easily analyse and use the data to hold governments to account. How ever, various authors have started to unravel the ambiguities, promises and perils of the open government phenomenon (Davies and Baw a 2012; Yu and Robinson 2012).
Meanw hile, the 'big data' phenomenon has gained remarkable momentum across a w ide range of industries and fields, as w ell as academia. Like many 'buzzw ords' that have entered the contemporary debate, 'big data' refers to a plethora of interconnected social, economical and technological phenomena, w ith reflections about the benefits and challenges of analysing "massive quantities of information produced by and about people, things and their interactions" (Boyd and Craw ford 2012:1) at their centre. The potential of large-scale datagathering has been praised for its unprecedented revolutionary possibilities, w hich could include a decisive improvement in the w ays citizens and governments interact.
Diverse voices have begun to question uncritical view s of these phenomena, for example providing more nuanced reflections on the pitfalls and threats of 'big data' (Boyd and Craw ford 2012; Couldry and Pow ell 2014; Craw ford, Gray and Miltner 2014; Tufecki 2014) .
These authors contend that 'big data' is not merely a technological issue, but first and foremost a 'mythology' (Mosco 2014), an emerging w orldview that has to be interrogated, and critically engaged w ith, not incontrovertibly accepted and applauded. Thus, understanding 'big data' means exploring the consequences of the computational turn across multiple disciplines, and through the alterations it creates in the spheres of epistemology, ontology and ethics. It also means examining the limitations, errors and biases in the gathering and interpretation of these massive quantities of information, as w ell as access to it. In sum, it means untangling the processes at the core of our 'algorithmic culture' (Hallinan and Striphas 2015) .
Other critical voices that tackle the limits, risks and threats of digital communication technologies in relation to democratic processes have emerged (Fuchs 2014; Dean 2005) .
Even so, mos t accounts of experiences and case studies related to the use and appropriation of digital technology in relation to civic engagement still put much emphasis on the use of online platforms to simply 'fix' feedback loops, allow ing citizens to provide feedback on public services, and the predominant mood remains optimistic about the potential opportunities that technology can offer for citizens to hold governments to account.
One of the key lessons of the Making All Voices Count programme i is precisely that the issue of accountability should be framed as a complex political problem, rather than an technical one. But, as has been show n in recent studies (Morozov 2013; Treré and Barranquero 2013), accountability has often been seen as a matter of simply 'finding the right technological problem-solving tool'. Furthermore, the controversial question of obtaining government responsiveness has been usually treated in technology studies as a linear and straightforw ard procedure (McGee 2014), rather than as a process that entails dealing strategically w ith pow er relations that influence w hich voices w ill be heard, thus constituting a delicate dance betw een mechanisms that promote citizens' voice and efforts to change government behaviours. How ever, the voice of citizens does not speak in a vacuum, but rather w ithin the boundaries and the limitations of contemporary neoliberalism, that systematically denies and undermines it (Couldry 2010) .
Much of the current focus neglects the w ays in w hich governments can and do use digital technology to survey and undermine citizens' attempts to hold them accountable. Instead, something that the recent National Security Agency-Snow den scandal made clear is that these technologies are used more to spy on us and limit our freedom, than to provide us w ith useful tools to improve the functioning of democratic institutions. 
The ectivism phenom enon
The 2012 elections w itnessed w hat some saw as an explosion of digital politics, w ith politicians embracing social media to spread their messages and to engage in dialogue w ith citizens. But they mostly considered online spaces as sites for both the premeditated construction of consensus and the artificial, algorithmic construction of consent, rather than environments for reinforcing democracy through dialogue, participation and transparency.
Octavio Islas has framed this behaviour as "authoritarian engineering" (Islas 2015:1), the adoption by Mexican politicians of dirty online strategies w hich reveal their incapacity and refusal to develop political campaigns that can build a trustw orthy base of sympathisers and follow ers in cyberspace, and the very opposite of citizen participation. A video posted on YouTube the day before the second presidential debate, The Truth of Peña Nieto on Twitter, ii revealed the existence of organised groups of so-called PRI ectivistas ('ectivists'), One case is particularly illuminating, described by philosopher Carlos Soto Morfín as a clear example of techno-authoritarianism ix . A study, commissioned by the new s programme of a liberal Mexican journalist and carried out by social netw ork and data-mining agency Mesura, exposed the massive use of bots to build an illusion of online support for a controversial energy reform (Aristegui Noticias 2015). Mesura documented the systematic deployment of bots to tw eet and re-tw eet in support of the reform, discovering that the time gap betw een the sending of a supportive original message and its re-tw eeting w as too short to be accomplished by a human being. Morfín, one of the authors of the study, concludes by w arning about the risks to w hich citizens are exposed in an era w hen the importance of digital politics is grow ing day by day, and w hen those in pow er have no ethical problems w ith manipulating public perception.
On 26 September 2014, a group of students departed the Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers'
College for a protest in the city of Iguala, about 130km aw ay. They never arrived. Exactly w hat happened remains unknow n, but w e do know that at least three students w ere killed and another 43 remain missing. The Mexican government's official version is that the students w ere killed after being handed over to the Guerreros Unidos cartel on the orders of the mayor of Iguala, but investigations conducted by the Mexican critical magazine Proceso and the US publication The Intercept portrayed a darker picture of government complacency.
After the event, several activists and citizens started to protest on social media, and the Tw itter hashtag #YaMeCanse (I am tired) -w hich expressed the feeling of not being able to take any more violence or permanent insecurity -soon became the core for mobilising and spreading information. But journalist Erin Gallagher, w ho covers protests for the online magazine Revolution N ews x soon noticed something atypical in the search results for the #YaMeCanse hashtags: that they w ere flooded w ith tw eets including the hashtag but no other content apart from random punctuation marks. The accounts that w ere tw eeting this kind of empty content w ere bots: they lacked follow ers, and w ere tw eeting automatically. The noise they created made it difficult for citizens to share information using #YaMeCanse, and the hashtag consequently dropped out of Tw itter's trending topics. Mexican blogger and data-mining analyst Alberto Escorcia has discovered a reliable w ay of detecting bot accounts by examining the number of connections a Tw itter account has w ith other users, and has been documenting the use of bots in Mexico to sabotage protests by preventing information from spreading, and to send death threats to specific activists. For example, since February 2015, anthropologist, activist and blogger Rossana Reguillo has received regular death threats on various social media platforms xi . Particularly harsh attacks via Tw itter lasted more than tw o months, and data-mining analysis of the Tw itter campaign show ed that bots and trolls w ere responsible for the majority of the attacks.
Another social m edia is possible? The #YoSoy132 m ovem ent
In the run-up to the 2012 elections, EPN's path to the presidency seemed unstoppable. But on 11 May , something unsettled his image as the only available option for Mexico. He arrived at the private, religious IberoAmerican University in Mexico City to give a lecture, an event that PRI expected to run in an uncomplicated w ay. How ever, during the candidate's presentation, several students began to question him about police repression and the killings that occurred w hen he w as Governor of the State of Mexico. When EPN justified those violent repressions, tensions rose, and he had to leave the university surrounded by a security cordon. Immediately after the event, PRI politicians described the students as violent, intolerant fascist thugs, going so far as to deny that they w ere students. At the same time, the Mexican telecracy and the new spaper chain Organización Editorial Mexicana presented versions of the event w hich portrayed EPN as a hero w ho had survived a boycott organized by the Left. This biased coverage led 131 IberoAmerican students to publish a video on YouTube xi i in w hich they displayed their student credentials and read their out their names to the camera. This pow erful act of reclaimed identity marked the start of the #YoSoy132 movement, w hen the phrase '131 students from Ibero' quickly became one of the trending topics on Tw itter in Mexico, and other students began to join the protest, stating 'I am 132'. This led to the creation of the hashtag w hichhashtag that w ent on to identify the w hole movement. While the dirty digital strategies of institutional politics w ere dominating cyberspace, these students proved to the w orld that digital technologies could be used also to spread critical voices, mobilise support, organise protests and foster collective identification processes.
The digital perils of a networked m ovem ent
The celebratory literature that has developed around the #YoSoy132 movement proclaims the role of social media in the development of a 'fifth state' and in the birth of a 'Mexican spring' (Islas and Arribas 2012) , and frames digital technologies as a pow erful media alternative to the Mexican telecracy (Andión Gamboa 2013). My research depicts a different scenario, w here everyday frictions and struggles, issues of exploitation, dataveillance and control -together w ith constant attempts at delegitimisation -continuously plague protestors' use of digital technologies. Activists' social media communications are constantly afflicted by clashes, struggles and discord. These divergences come to manifest themselves in terms of daily interactions as concern and discomfort w ith integrating social media into protest practices. Issues of ephemerality and w eak ties seep through movement interactions by raising questions of authority and belonging, played out in terms of conflicts over w ho has access to digital media, and w hat can be posted on social media platforms in the name of any given protest. These are illustrated by the Cossío case, in w hich a w eb platform w as used to infiltrate the movement, gather data on activists and post tw o videos to try to undermine the reputation of #YoSoy132.
The Cossío case: web surveillance and video aggressions
In May 2012, a man named Manuel Cossío offered #YoSoy132 activists his digital expertise and a fully functional w eb portal, YoSoy132.mx. Only ten days after the emergence of #YoSoy132, Cossío entered the movement through one of its most prominent student activists, Saúl Alvídrez. While Alvídrez and other activists had already acquired the YoSoy132.com and the YoSoy132.com.mx domains, it w as the YoSoy132.mx registered by Cossío that w as finally adopted, thanks to Cossío's rhetorical skills in selling the movement his "valuable, ready-to-go product" xiii during various assemblies and meetings. Announced as the official page of the movement by various activists on their Tw itter feeds and Facebook pages, this professional-looking w ebsite, fully integrated w ith possibilities for access and interactions w ith other platforms like Google and Facebook, w as extensively adopted for debate, organisation, content spreading, and especially for the archiving of contributors' data. But, after a month of intense use of the w ebsite, something strange occurred. On 18 June, tw o YouTube videos appeared on the home page of the #YoSoy132 portal and in the YouTube account 'Yo Soy' xi v .
In the first video, w e see in the background the fixed image of the face of Saúl Alvídrez, at the same time as w e hear his voice and see yellow subtitles that report his w ords. The audio, clearly recorded w ithout his consent, appears as a combination of various of Alvídrez' informal talks, in w hich #YoSoy132 student speaks about the movement and relations w ith The tw o videos caused controversy and conflict: Alvídrez had to leave the movement and the Mexican telecracy took advantage of the event to insinuate that the videos represented a clear proof that the Mexican movement had been manipulated from the beginning by the intellectuals of the Left. #YoSoy132 activists eventually realized that the platform w as intended as a w ay to monitor, control and profile them and decided to migrate to another platform, yosoy132media.mx. This migration and the dangers related to the use of the other so-called 'apocryphal w eb pages' w ere officially announced on Facebook and spread through multiple Tw itter accounts in order to inform citizens about the real intentions of Cossío and the nature of the fake portal; other users and supporters from the Mexican blogosphere also retw eeted the information.
According to the Contralínea w ebsite, the platform w as able to steal the information of more than seventy thousand citizens w ith yet unexplored consequences for the Mexican resistance. But w e still do not have clear figures and data on the scope and the results of this operation of sabotage and surveillance by the Mexican government, and w e almost surely never w ill. The mechanisms of this kind of digital w arfare remain opaque, secret and very difficult to decode. What this example clearly show s is the extent to w hich political control can use the technological platform through w hich opposition is carried out, stealing data and monitoring protest activities, controlling the information flow ing through the platform, and exploiting it to compromise and destabilise the reputation of the movement.
The same digital communication technologies that allow engaged citizens to organise, spread alternative information, and make the government accountable have been easily infiltrated and used against them.
Conclusions: the lim its and future horizons of data activism
In contrast to celebratory accounts that in various disciplines and fields have conceived the increasing use of digital technologies as a w ay to make governments accountable, and solve most of the issues that plague contemporary political systems, this article, based on an exploration of social and political experiences of the Mexican context, has demonstrated that digital tools have been successfully deployed by parties and governments to manufacture consent, sabotage dissidence, threaten activists, and gather information w ithout citizens' consent. Now adays, institutions and parties cannot only count on the traditional channels of propaganda, such as the pow erful and biased mainstream media apparatus, but can also use their vast financial resources in order to hire crow ds of sympathisers that can boost their image on digital platforms, deploy armies of bots and trolls that can be activated to sabotage dissent and hinder critical voices on social media, and infiltrate movements w ith imposter techies w ho can use w ebsites to steal sensible activists' data.
Against these pow erful strategies, activists have few digital w eapons at their disposal, above all because they cannot count on huge economic resources. How ever, as w e have seen throughout the article, some of them have started to use their technological skills in social netw ork analysis and data-mining techniques in order to unmask and denounce these dirty strategies on various radical media outlets. Perhaps w e can conceive of these tactics as 'counterprotocol practices' (Gallow ay and Thacker 2007) that use the same advanced technological tools that the pow erful deploy to control us in order to make their strategies visible and accountable. This f orm of 'data activism' (Milan 2015) can empow er citizens and activists in their quest for truth and accountability, but given the unbalanced distribution of pow er, these attempts remain feeble and seldom influence public opinion at the international level, or the effective counteraction of such dirty schemes.
Before singing the praises of digital communication technologies to make democratic institutions more accountable and reliable, w e should recognise, understand and try to overcome the plethora of dangers and risks that are associated w ith them in the arena of digital politics. The algorithmic construction of consent and the artificial sabotage of dissent demonstrate that there is nothing inherently democratic in digital technologies. In order to guarantee that a plurality of critical voices is represented and can be heard, citizens have to struggle against increasingly sophisticated techniques of control and repression that successfully exploit the very mechanisms that many consider to be emancipatory technologies.
